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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFRONTING ACCUSED WITH
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM AS "INTERROGATION" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF MIRANDA-State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623,
242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).
Miranda Gets the Silent Treatment
INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of cases have grappled with the application of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. I
Many of those cases have dealt with the question of what constitutes
"custodial interrogation" requiring "Miranda warnings" by law en-
forcement officers before statements elicited from a defendant may
be used against him.'
In State v. McLean,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that, under the facts of that case, confronting a defendant with
evidence against him does not constitute "interrogation." There-
fore, statements made by the defendant properly were admitted
against him even though he had not been advised of his rights under
Miranda.
THE CASE
The State tried and convicted the defendant on an indictment
charging him with second degree rape. The rape occurred in a park-
ing lot behind an apartment building. A few hours after the rape, a
friend of the victim found a driver's license, a checkbook bearing the
name "Robert McLean, Jr." and a cap in the parking lot. These
items were turned over to the police when the rape was reported.
A warrant for the defendant's arrest on the rape charge was
obtained on May 10, 1977. Sometime prior to May 13, 1977, the
defendant was arrested and placed in jail on an entirely unrelated
charge. The subsequent events were reported by the court as fol-
lows:
At about 7:55 a.m. on 13 May, Detective Holder went to the jail.
He had in his pocket at the time the arrest warrant charging defen-
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. at 444.
3. 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).
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dant with rape. Officer Holder walked into the room carrying in
his hand a work pad and a check which was found at the scene of
the rape in the rear parking lot of 1832 Wilshire Avenue. He also
had the cap found at the scene. The check had the name "Robert
McLean, Jr." on it and was on top of the work pad in plain view.
Officer Holder did not speak. He -placed his work pad and the
check on top of a desk in plain view of defendant but said nothing.
Defendant reached over, looked at the check, took hold of it and
said, "This is my check. I wrote this check when I did not know
how to write checks. However, the check is good." Officer Holder
said nothing. When defendant observed the cap he looked at Offi-
cer Holder, began to act nervous, his hand began to quiver, and
he said "What's that man?" Officer Holder said nothing. A few
seconds passed and the officer lit a cigarette. Defendant asked for
a cigarette and the officer gave him one. In the words of Officer
Holder: "Few more seconds passed as we were smoking the ciga-
rettes and before I started to leave the room he stated 'I liked to
have been a free man.'" Shortly thereafter, at 8:15 a.m., Officer
Holder read the warrant charging defendant with rape and advised
defendant of his constitutional rights. Defendant refused to sign a
waiver. No interrogation thereafter took place.'
At trial the defendant challenged the competency of Officer
Holder's testimony as to the defendant's statements. The trial judge
found that defendant's statements were voluntary and not in re-
sponse to any in-custody interrogation. The statements were admit-
ted in evidence.
BACKGROUND
Miranda v. Arizona5 held that: "The prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination." ' The court set forth with particularity the
warnings which the defendant must be given before interrogation
may take place if any statements elicited are to be admissible at
trial.7
The rationale of Miranda was that the Fifth Amendment prohi-
bition against compelling the accused to incriminate himself ex-
tended to an accused who was in custody. Since custodial surround-
4. Id. at 626, 242 S.E.2d at 816.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Id. at 444.
7. Supra note 2.
[Vol. 1:173
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ings are inherently compulsory, adequate procedural safeguards are
necessary to insure that any statement made by an accused is truly
the product of his free will rather than the inherently compelling
atmosphere of police custody.8
Only statements elicited by interrogation from a defendant who
is in custody must be preceded by-warnings designed to inform the
accused of his rights.' Voluntary statements by an accused remain
admissible under Miranda. Miranda designated "custody" as the
point at which the privilege against self-incrimination begins to
operate" and "interrogation" as the conduct which is prohibited
unless the required warnings are given.
Miranda did not provide a clear definition of what constitutes
"interrogation" for purposes of applying the warnings required. At
one point the court said, "By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."" The court then proceeded to dis-
cuss at length the psychological techniques of interrogation. 2 The
opinion is unclear as to what conduct other than questioning might
be considered "interrogation." State courts are divided on what
conduct other than questioning constitutes "interrogation."'"
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. McLean 4
elected to decide what constitutes "interrogation" for Miranda pur-
8. The court said that procedural safeguards are necessary to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings in order for a statement obtained from
a defendant to be truly the product of his free choice. 384 U.S. at 458. However, it
is clear from a reading of the decision as a whole that the fact of custody alone is
not sufficient to render otherwise voluntary statements involuntary. Some type of
interrogation must also take place. There is not a right to Miranda warnings merely
because the defendant is in custody.
9. What constitutes "custody" for purposes of Miranda has been the issue in
many cases. The question is beyond the scope of this note. The cases on the point
are collected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
10. 384 U.S. at 478.
11. Id. at 444 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 448-58. It would appear that the court did not intend to confine
"interrogation" to verbal questioning in light of its concern with the psychological
techniques used in modem police investigation. The court has subsequently held
that a declaratory statement by a police officer to a defendant constituted interro-
gation. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 424 (1977).
13. The McLean decision cites several examples. 294 N.C. at 629, 242 S.E.2d
at 818.
14. 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).
1979]
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poses on a case by case basis, rather than by adopting any particular
definition or test.15 The court offered no explanation of its conclu-
sion that the officer's acts did not constitute interrogation stating
that "[the officer] did not ask questions or engage in conduct
which, in our view, is inquisitional in nature."" The court refused
to give any insight as to what factors it would consider in determin-
ing what conduct would constitute interrogation.
A policy of post hoc determinations and no announced criteria
by which such determinations will be made certainly provides the
court with ample flexibility in formulating its standards. This same
flexibility, however, presents the North Carolina bench and bar
with certain difficulties in determining at what point confronting
the defendant becomes inquisitional in nature so as to mandate the
Miranda warnings. The court made clear that future cases may
involve conduct which will constitute "interrogation" even though
no questions are asked.
The McLean decision may be analyzed with reference to three
elements involved in confronting a defendant with evidence: (1) the
length of time during which the confrontation takes place; (2) the
causal connection between the confrontation and any statements
elicited; (3) the intent of the law enforcement officer in causing the
confrontation.
The confrontation in McLean took place over a period of ap-
proximately twenty minutes: If "interrogation" occurs without
Miranda warnings, then its duration is irrelevant since any state-
ment elicited would be inadmissible. Thus, the question is whether
the length of time during which the confrontation takes place has
any bearing on whether such conduct constitutes interrogation. Cer-
tainly if a defendant were repeatedly confronted with incriminating
evidence over a prolonged period of time, this should be a factor to
be considered to determine if interrogation has occurred. The length
of the confrontation should also shed some light on the intent of the
police officer in staging the confrontation. However, the court did
not discuss that issue, and the facts make it clear that the police
officer had more than ample time to serve the warrant if that were
his only intent." Thus, while the length of time may become a factor
in future cases, apparently it was not a factor in the McLean case.
15. Id. at 629, 242 S.E.2d at 818.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 630, 242 S.E.2d at 818.
18. The officer in McLean asserted that his intent was to ascertain the true
identity of the defendant. Record at 7, 40, State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242
S.E.2d 814 (1978).
[Vol. 1:173
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The existence of a causal connection between the police officer's
conduct and the defendant's statements is not the sole factor -in
determining whether interrogation has occurred. If the defendant in
McLean had not been confronted with the evidence against him, he
would not have made a statement. The defendant made his state-
ments in direct response to the evidence placed in front of him.
When the defendant was advised of his rights, he refused to waive
them and made no further statement.
If one looks to the facts of this case to determine the police
officer's intent in staging the confrontation, clearly his intent was
to elicit a statement from the defendant.19 The officer had the war-
rant for defendant's arrest in his pocket when he went to the jail.
He went to the jail for the purpose of seeing the defendant. He
placed the evidence in plain view of the defendant and never spoke
a word in response to defendant's questions. Thus, apparently the
court did not feel that the intent of the officer to elicit information
was a determining factor.
Since none of the factors discussed above constitutes a deter-
mining factor in deciding what constitutes interrogation, and the
court does not discuss the reasons why it held the officer's conduct
not to be inquisitional in nature, the case provides no guidelines as
to what will be treated as interrogation in future cases.
The dissent 0 takes the view that the officer's conduct was in-
tended to elicit an incriminating statement and placed the accused
under a compulsion to speak, thus constituting interrogation. The
dissent further noted that the practical effect of the majority opin-
ion would be to encourage the police to devise ways to evade the
requirements of Miranda .2 1
CONCLUSION
The supreme court's decision in McLean is inconsistent with
the clear intent of the Miranda decision to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination against the inherently compelling atmos-
phere of custodial surroundings. McLean encourages law enforce-
ment officers to devise means of indirectly interrogating defendants
without advising them of their constitutional rights. The case offers
19. Even if the officer's assertion that his purpose was to ascertain the identity
of the defendant is true, id., supra note 18, his effort was still an attempt to elicit
incriminating information since the items he used were the same items which
tended to connect the defendant with the crime scene.
20. 294 N.C. at 635, 242 S.E.2d at 821.
21. Id. at 636, 242 S.E.2d at 822.
1979]
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little guidance to lawyers and judges for the decision of future cases.
The dissent takes the better view that if the purpose is to elicit
information, no matter what form it takes, then the defendant must
be given Miranda warnings if his statements are to be admitted at
trial.
William M. Spivey
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